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I. Introduction
Ramon Hernandez of Kent, Washington, was fired after filing several com
plaints that he did not receive thousands of dollars in unpaid wages.1 He worked at
a local bakery for over two years; his wages were constantly withheld.2 Hernandez
continued working at the bakery despite his repeatedly ignored complaints.3
Finally, after the sum he was owed reached nearly $20,000, Hernandez made
one final complaint, which led to his termination.4 At first glance, Hernandez’s
situation appears easily resolvable, but his status as an undocumented worker
makes an otherwise routine foray into state labor and employment law a matter
of national immigration policy. Given estimates that undocumented workers
currently comprise five percent of the American workforce, Hernandez’s situation
is hardly unique.5

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2011. I would like to thank the Wyoming
Law Review Editorial Board, particularly Nick Haderlie, Devon Stiles, Kevin Daniels, and Amy
Staehr for their hard work and insightful comments. I would also like to thank my faculty advisor,
Noah Novogrodsky, for helping develop the ideas that led to this comment as well as providing
guidance throughout the process of composing and refining it. Finally, such an endeavor would be
meaningless without the help and support of friends and family. I give many thanks to all of those
who offered their tremendous support and encouragement along the way.
1
Patrick Oppmann, Illegal Immigrants Struggle to Receive Back Pay, CNN.com (Oct. 28,
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/10/27/illegals.back.pay/.
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id.

See Julia Preston, 11.2 Million Illegal Immigrants in U.S. in 2010, Report Says; No Change
from ’09, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2011, at A15 (citing a study estimating 8 million of the 11.2 million
illegal immigrants living in the United States are part of the American workforce).
5
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The United States legal system continues to struggle with the daunting task
of defining the rights and obligations of those lacking proper documentation
living and working within its borders. The debate over immigration is largely
rooted in discussions concerning the fate of the undocumented labor force.6
The seminal case, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 7 only confuses the already tenuous legal distinctions between documented
and undocumented workers.8 In effect, Hoffman created a system that leaves
undocumented workers—on the basis of their immigration status—without
the remedies available to their authorized counterparts.9 Under Hoffman and its
progeny, undocumented workers remain protected by labor and employment
laws but lack the ability to pursue the legal remedies normally available to legal
workers, thus placing them in an ill-defined legal space.10
As recent events in Arizona, Oklahoma, Utah, and other states indicate,
enforcing immigration laws has become a heated issue at the state level as well.11
6
See id. (noting both the high percentage of undocumented immigrants in the workforce
and the debate over the Obama Administration’s workplace-oriented immigration policies).
7

535 U.S. 137 (2002).

See Thomas J. Walsh, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: How the Supreme Court
Eroded Labor Law and Workers Rights in the Name of Immigration Policy, 21 Law & Ineq. 313,
339 (2003).
8

9
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 Am. U.
L. Rev. 1361, 1401 (2009) (“[Hoffman] constructs a world in which citizens are allowed to seek
redress for incidents of discrimination, relegating unauthorized workers to a lawless remedial realm
to match their lawless existence in the community.”).
10
See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the manner in which denying
the National Labor Relations Board remedial power will snub undocumented workers); Escobar v.
Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D.Tex. 2003) (“[Hoffman] did not specifically foreclose all
remedies for undocumented workers under the [NLRA] or other comparable federal labor statutes . . . .”);
see also Oppmann, supra note 1 (noting in some cases where the traditional remedies are not
available, undocumented workers have resorted to protest politics, effectively shaming employers
into compliance with labor and employment laws).

See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 869 (9th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010) (affirming the district court’s determination that an Arizona
statute, which allows the State to revoke business licenses upon a showing that a business employed
undocumented workers, is facially valid); Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Edmondson,
594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding federal immigration law preempted an Oklahoma law
designed to curb illegal immigration through various employment verification standards and by
making it a discriminatory practice to discharge a citizen or legal worker while knowingly retaining
an undocumented worker); Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 604, 618–19 (Ct. App. 2007)
(holding “the prevailing wage law and the post-Hoffman statutes are not preempted by the IRCA,”
therefore allowing plaintiffs to bring such claims despite their undocumented status); Piscitelli v.
Classic Residence by Hyatt, 973 A.2d 948, 961 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (holding no express or
implied private right of action is available against businesses employing undocumented workers); see
also Lee Davidson, Senate Okays Utahns Sponsoring Immigrants, Salt Lake Tribune (Mar. 23, 2011),
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/51389489-76/bill-immigration-niederhauser-senate.html.csp
(discussing a bill that circumvents the federal immigration process and allows immigrants to live and
work in Utah provided they pass a background check and health screening, among other things).
11
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Groups like the Minuteman Project—whose goals consist of raising public
awareness of what they label an ongoing “illegal alien invasion” and advocating
for enforcement of immigration laws—increase the visibility of the debate, as well
as exacerbate the rancorous divide it creates.12 A poll conducted in May of 2010
indicated fifty-three percent of respondents felt “illegal immigrants making low
wages might make U.S. employers less willing to pay American workers a decent
wage.”13 There is continuing pressure to address these issues at both the state and
national levels.
Currently, the minimal rights afforded undocumented workers are in danger
of erosion.14 Case law indicates the United States Supreme Court has created a
hierarchy of national policies placing immigration status over considerations of
civil liberties and human rights.15 The privileging of immigration law and policy
above the policies of labor and employment law parallels a shift in the United States
from a territorial conception of membership to a status-centric approach.16 This
effectively creates a population of undocumented workers whose immigration
status potentially eliminates protections under labor and employment laws.17

12
Jim Gilchrist, An Essay by Jim Gilchrist, 22 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 415, 416 (2008) (discussing
the goals of the Minuteman Project from the perspective of one of the group’s co-founders); see
James Duff Lyall, Vigilante State: Reframing the Minuteman Project in American Politics and Culture,
23 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 257, 258 (2009) (noting the substantial impact the Minuteman Project and
similar groups have on the debate surrounding immigration).
13
Lydia Saad, Americans Value Both Aspects of Immigration Reform, Gallup (May 4, 2010),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/127649/Americans-Value-Aspects-Immigration-Reform.aspx.

See Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., 2002 WL 1163263, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2002); D. Carolina
Núñez, Fractured Membership: Deconstructing Territoriality to Secure Rights and Remedies for the
Undocumented Worker, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 817, 872 (2010) (arguing that courts increasingly use
status as a basis of assigning rights, oftentimes to deny certain rights traditionally protected under
a territorial approach); Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 1115,
1153–54 (2009) (discussing the “steady chipping away” at rights of undocumented workers in
both employment and other contexts); Shahid Haque, Note, Beyond Hoffman Plastic: Reforming
National Labor Relations Policy to Conform to the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 79 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 1357, 1359 (2005) (noting the uncertainty of undocumented workers’ rights in the wake
of Hoffman).
14

15
See Sarah H. Cleveland, Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Workers: Advisory
Opinion, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 460, 461 (“[O]nce an employment relationship is established with
an undocumented worker, ‘the migrant acquires rights as a worker, which must be recognized and
guaranteed, irrespective of his regular or irregular status in the State of employment.’” (quoting
Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 134 (Sept. 17, 2003))); Núñez supra note 14, at 821
(commentating immigration status “often displaces territorial presence as the ultimate determinant
of membership”).

See Núñez, supra note 14, at 851–52 (noting the Hoffman majority held awarding a remedy
afforded by labor laws runs afoul of the policies underlying immigration law).
16

See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002); Davila
v. Grimes, No. 2:09-CV-407, 2010 WL 1737121, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2010) (“[T]he Court
recognizes that Plaintiffs [sic] status in this country may impact his claim for lost future wages.”).
17
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Further, it runs contrary to the policies behind the labor, employment, and
immigration laws purportedly informing court decisions.18 In order to further
these policies and place undocumented workers in a clearly defined and coherent
legal framework, Congress should amend the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA) to include language that expressly forbids immigration law
from trumping other legal regimes.19
This comment begins by discussing the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).20 These statutes—and the
definitions contained within them—are at the center of an increasingly ambiguous
interaction of labor, employment, and immigration law. After analyzing these
statutes and associated case law, this comment discusses the IRCA, which makes
it unlawful for employers to employ undocumented workers.21 After the passage
of the IRCA, American courts began applying the NLRA and the FLSA with
an eye to immigration law, an interaction that culminated in the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman.22 This comment analyzes Hoffman and its
progeny, noting the potential danger in the continued application of Hoffman’s
reasoning.23 Analysis of the relevant statutes and case law reveals that by relegating
undocumented workers to a legal realm in which remedies are scarcely available,
the courts ultimately undermine the policies behind immigration, labor, and
education law, thereby leaving the responsibility for correcting the confusing state
of the law to Congress.24

II. Background
This section begins by explaining the labor and employment laws relevant to
the discussion of the rights of undocumented workers.25 It then considers a number
of cases focusing on provisions of those laws affecting undocumented workers.26
This section then discusses immigration law and a handful of related cases before
examining the leading case in the area, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National

18
See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (opining that awarding an undocumented
worker a back pay award would further the goals of both labor and immigration laws).
19

See infra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 29–49 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 50–95 and accompanying text (discussing employment and labor law cases);
infra notes 96–100 and accompanying text (discussing immigration law, particularly the IRCA).
21

See infra notes 102–10 and accompanying text (discussing several cases leading to Hoffman);
infra notes 111–24 (discussing Hoffman).
22

23

See infra notes 136–78 and accompanying text.

24

See infra notes 179–85 and accompanying text.

25

See infra notes 29–49 and accompanying text.

26

See infra notes 50–95 and accompanying text.
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Labor Relations Board. 27 Finally, this section examines the traditional methods
of assigning rights to immigrants as well as the implications of membership in
obtaining rights.28

A. Labor and Employment Law
Largely as a response to the Great Depression of the 1920s, Congress passed
the NLRA in 1935.29 In the NLRA’s policy declaration, Congress addressed the
problems that spurred the legislation, claiming unequal relationships between
employers and employees affected commerce because employers were able to
maintain substandard wages and working conditions.30 Congress implemented a
policy designed to eradicate those obstacles by encouraging collective bargaining
and granting workers the right to organize.31 The NLRA stabilized the workplace
by supporting unions and regulating the relationships between labor and
management.32 Additionally, the NLRA created the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) to administer and implement the provisions of the statute.33
The NLRA expressly defines employees’ rights regarding labor activity.34 The
statute states that every employee has the right to self-organization, union activity,

27
See infra notes 96 –110 and accompanying text (discussing immigration law, generally, and a
select group of cases); infra notes 111–24 and accompanying text (discussing the Hoffman decision).
28

See infra notes 125–35 and accompanying text.

29

Archibald Cox et al., Labor Law: Cases and Materials 75 (14th ed. 2006).

29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). The NLRA contemplates the lopsided relationship between
employers and employees:
30

The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized
in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries.
Id.
31

Id.

Christopher Brackman, Note, Hoffman v. NLRB, Creating More Harm than Good: Why
the Supreme Court Should Not Have Denied Illegal Workers a Backpay Remedy Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 71 UMKC L. Rev. 717, 718 (2003) (discussing the genesis of the NLRA);
Haque, supra note 14, at 79 (noting the NLRA’s focus on “labor-management relations of businesses
engaged in interstate commerce”).
32

33
29 U.S.C. §§ 153–156; see Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 223, 229 (2005) (indicating that the policies of the NLRA deem the
manner in which workers are treated as central to a democratic society); Brackman, supra note 32,
at 718.
34

29 U.S.C. § 157.
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and collective bargaining.35 Furthermore, employees generally have the right to
refrain from engaging in such activities.36 The NLRA also describes unfair labor
practices, which it then empowers the NLRB to prevent through cease and desist
orders, reinstatement of employment, back pay, and possibly injunctive relief.37 As
such, in order to receive the protections of the NLRA, one must be an employee.38
The definition of “employee” is a source of much legal and political
dispute. Under the NLRA, “employee” is a defined term and encompasses “any
employee.” 39 The statute goes on to enumerate a list of seven exceptions to the
otherwise expansive definition.40 Notably, none of the listed exceptions mention
undocumented workers or immigration status.41
In the seventy-five years since the NLRA’s passage, numerous decisions by
the NLRB and American courts have addressed the manner in which the NLRA
is applied to undocumented workers.42 Many of these cases have struggled to
locate undocumented workers within the definitional framework of the NLRA,
particularly on the issue of whether undocumented workers are “employees” under
the statute.43 While labor laws like the NLRA deal with workers and their collective
relationships with management, employment laws protect the individual rights of

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id. §§ 158, 160.

38

Id. § 157.

Id. § 152(3) (emphasis added). The definition includes those individuals whose employment
was terminated because of any unfair labor practice or labor dispute:
39

The term “employee” shall include any employee . . . and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment . . . .
Id.
40
Id. The exceptions include agricultural laborers, domestic servants, individuals employed
by their parents or spouses, independent contractors, supervisors, a person employed by an employer
subject to the Railway Labor Act, and any other person employed by an employer that does not
meet the statutory definition of “employer.” Id.; see also id. § 152(2); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467
U.S. 883, 892 (1984) (noting that undocumented workers are not among the listed exceptions to
the definition of “employee”).
41

29 U.S.C. § 152(3).

Ellen Dannin, Legislative Intent and Impasse Resolution Under the National Labor Relations
Act: Does Law Matter?, 15 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 11, 12 (1997); see, e.g., Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151–52 (2002); Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 891.
42

43
See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 891–92; Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 967 F.2d
1115, 1118–19.
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employees.44 The FLSA, one of the preeminent employment laws, has experienced
a similar trajectory as the NLRA with respect to undocumented workers.
Congress passed the FLSA three years after signing the NLRA into law.45 It
provides employees with such protections as minimum wages and maximum hours
to curb labor conditions that erode the “minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.” 46 Like the NLRA before it,
the FLSA defines “employee” in a specific, albeit broad manner.47 Generally, the
FLSA’s definition includes all individuals employed by employers.48 Within the
listed exceptions, there is no mention of undocumented workers, illegal aliens, or
immigration status.49

B. Cases Leading to Hoffman
Both the NLRA and the FLSA were passed within a few years of each other
as a part of the New Deal legislation.50 As such, the policies behind the statutes
are similar, and both employ extremely broad definitions of “employee.” 51
Accordingly, courts have used one statute’s definition of employee to give context
to the other and often use the definitions interchangeably within the context
of immigration.52
44
See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2685, 2688
(2008) (stating the traditional view “that labor and employment law constitute dichotomous, and in
a fundamental respect incompatible, regulatory regimes”). Compare Mark A. Rothstein & Lance
Liebman, Employment Law: Cases and Materials 33 (6th ed. 2007) (noting that while collective
bargaining is important to employment law, employment law addresses “individual rather than
collective rights”), with Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining labor law as “governing
the relationship between employers and employees, esp. law governing the dealings of employers
and the unions that represent employees”).
45
Compare National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)), with Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat.
1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006)).
46

29 U.S.C. § 202.

47

Id. § 203(e).

Id. § 203(e)(1) (“Except as [otherwise] provided . . . the term ‘employee’ means any
individual employed by an employer.”).
48

49
Id. Exceptions to the FLSA’s definition of employee include employees of public agencies,
intra-family agricultural employees, and volunteers performing services for public agencies. Id.
§ 203(e)(2)–(4).
50
See Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New
Deal and Fair Deal, 19 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 1, 2 (acknowledging both the NLRA and the FLSA
were part of the “New Deal labor regime”).
51
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 723 (1947); Patel v. Quality Inn S.,
846 F.2d 700, 703 n.3 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting the “NLRA’s definitional framework is virtually
identical to that of the FLSA”); see Andrew S. Lewinter, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB: An
Invitation to Exploit, 20 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 509, 526 (2003).

See Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 723; Patel, 846 F.2d at 703 n.3; Lewinter, supra note
51, at 526.
52
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the
issue of whether undocumented workers fit within the NLRA’s definition of
“employee” in NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co.53 In Apollo, an employee’s mother made
a complaint to the Department of Labor regarding her son’s withheld overtime
pay.54 She was given complaint forms for her son, which she also distributed to
other employees.55 Six of the seven employees who filed complaints were laid off.56
The NLRB issued Apollo Tire a cease and desist order for its unfair labor practices
under section 157 of the NLRA.57
On appeal, Apollo contended that Congress meant to exclude undocumented
workers from its definition of “employee” to avoid running afoul of national
immigration policy.58 The court disagreed, finding the statutory language,
combined with the NLRB’s past holdings, clearly placed undocumented workers
within the scope of the NLRA.59 The court also noted that ruling otherwise would
encourage employers to seek undocumented workers as employees, which would
certainly run contrary to immigration policy.60
The United States Supreme Court addressed this same issue in Sure-Tan,
Inc. v. NLRB.61 In Sure-Tan, a disgruntled employer asked the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to check the immigration status of several employees
after they participated in union activities.62 When INS agents visited Sure-Tan’s
grounds they arrested five employees, none of whom had proper documentation.63
In lieu of official deportation proceedings, the workers were permitted to leave the
United States voluntarily and were on a bus for Mexico within a day.64 Upon hearing
the case, the NLRB determined Sure-Tan violated the NLRA’s prohibition of unfair
labor practices.65 Specifically, in reporting the workers to INS merely for their

53

604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977).

Id. at 1181. Before going to the Department of Labor, she complained to the general
manager, who responded by telling her husband that if his wife made a formal complaint she would
be killed. Id.
54

55

Id.

56

Id. at 1182.

57

Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).

58

Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d at 1182.

59

Id. at 1182–83.

See id. at 1183. Judge Kennedy argued in a concurring opinion that leaving undocumented
workers without labor law protections “would leave helpless the very persons who most need
protection from exploitative employer practices.” Id. at 1184.
60

61

467 U.S. 883, 886 (1984).

62

Id. at 886–87.

63

Id. at 887.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 888.
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support of the union, the NLRB found that Sure-Tan violated sections 158(a)(1)
and (3) of the NLRA.66 As a result, the NLRB issued a cease and desist order
requiring Sure-Tan to halt its unfair labor practices and ordered reinstatement of
the employees with back pay.67
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
NLRB’s order but made several modifications regarding reinstatement and back
pay.68 The court first determined that reinstatement would only be proper if
the workers’ presence and work authorization were legal.69 Simply put, in order
to get their jobs back, the workers must have first entered the United States
legally or adjusted their immigration status and obtained official employment
authorization.70 The court also found the NLRB’s decision allowing reinstatement
within six months was inadequate and failed to give the employees a reasonable
time to arrange for legal entry.71 The appellate court held that while back pay should
not be given for any period of time during which the employees were ineligible
to work—which in this case meant the entire duration of their employment—a
minimum award must be set in order to “effectuate the policies of the [National
Labor Relations] Act.” 72
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Sure-Tan decision in part
and reversed it in part.73 The majority opinion analyzed the NLRA’s definition
of “employee” to determine whether the provisions of the NLRA applied to
undocumented workers.74 Acknowledging that the NLRB’s construction of
the term deserved tremendous deference, the Court nonetheless conducted its
own analysis of the statutory language.75 It found that undocumented workers
plainly fall within the expansive category of “any employee” because they are not
among the expressly listed exceptions.76 The Court also noted such a construction
furthered the policies of the NLRA by “encouraging and protecting the collective-

Sure-Tan Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1187 (1978). The NLRA states that employees have
certain rights of self-organization and labor involvement and that any attempt on the part of an
employer to interfere with those rights is a violation. See 29 U.S.C. § 157(a)(1) (2006).
66

67

Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 888–89.

68

Id. at 889–90.

69

Id. at 889.

70

See id.

Id. at 889–90 (ordering that the reinstatement offers be both written in Spanish and held
open for four years).
71

72

Id. at 890 (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 592, 606 (7th Cir. 1982)).

73

See id. at 906.

74

Id. at 891.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 891–92.
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bargaining process.” 77 Further, the Court considered whether Sure-Tan’s reporting
of its employees to the INS was an unfair business practice, thereby rendering
the company liable.78 It determined that there are certain occasions in which it
is proper for an employer to report an illegal alien—when reporting criminal
activity, for example.79 In Sure-Tan, however, the evidence showed the reporting
was solely in retaliation for the employees’ union activity, which was protected by
the NLRA.80 As such, Sure-Tan’s acts violated the NLRA.81
Although the majority affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s holding regarding
the application of the NLRA to undocumented workers, it disagreed with the
appellate court’s remedial modifications to the NLRB’s order.82 The Court held
that not only did the lower court exceed its authority, but that in doing so it forced
the NLRB to act beyond its authority as well.83 Imposing a minimum six-month
back pay period, the majority argued, was based entirely on speculation and ran
counter to the remedial policies of the NLRA.84 Additionally, the appellate court’s
modifications regarding the reinstatement orders were determined an intrusion
on the significant deference afforded to the NLRB.85 The Court held that the
NLRB was the appropriate body to fashion remedies, not the courts.86 As such,
the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit with instructions for it to
remand the case back to the NLRB to create a remedial order in compliance
with the Court’s opinion.87 Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
joined in the decision but disagreed with the majority’s rejection of the remedial
modification.88 They argued that the Court created a situation in which an
undocumented worker entitled to protections under the NLRA could be left
without any remedy.89
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the
issue again in Local 512 v. NLRB, using the Sure-Tan decision as a guide.90 The
NLRB held Felbro, Inc. violated the NLRA by refusing to engage in collective
77

Id. at 892.

78

Id. at 894.

79

Id. at 895.

80

Id. at 895–96.

81

Id.

82

Id. at 898–99.

83

Id. at 899–900.

84

Id. at 901.

85

Id. at 905.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 906.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 911 (“[T]he contradiction in the Court’s opinion is total.”).

90

Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986).
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bargaining.91 The NLRB—based on its understanding of Sure-Tan—modified its
back pay order to be conditioned on a showing of the employees’ legal status.92 The
Ninth Circuit found this reading of Sure-Tan misguided.93 Sure-Tan, it argued, in
no way permitted the NLRB to look at an employee’s legal status in determining
his eligibility for back pay.94 According to the Ninth Circuit, Sure-Tan’s holding
merely dealt with back pay to employees unavailable for work—and therefore
ineligible for back pay—because they were out of the country with little prospect
of legal reentry; their immigration status was incidental.95

C. Immigration Law
The primary law governing immigration and related matters is the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).96 The INA remained silent on the
issue of employment of undocumented workers until 1986, when Congress
passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).97 The IRCA made it
unlawful for employers to knowingly hire undocumented workers.98 Further, it
required employers to comply with an employment verification system designed
to prevent the employment of undocumented workers.99 As such, it created an
ostensible conflict between immigration law and the protections previously given
to undocumented workers under the NLRA and the FLSA.100
Courts have interpreted the IRCA in a variety of ways.101 In Patel v. Quality
Inn South, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined
the IRCA did not prevent undocumented workers from receiving protection
under the FLSA.102 It disagreed with the lower court’s contention that in passing

91

Id. at 708.

92

Id.

93

See id. at 716–17.

94

Id. at 717.

95

Id. at 716–17.

96

8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006).

Id. § 1324a; see Lewinter, supra note 51, at 514–15; L. Tracy Harris, Note, Conflict or
Double Deterrence? FLSA Protection of Illegal Aliens and the Immigration Reform and Control Act,
72 Minn. L. Rev. 900, 900 (1988) (observing that prior to the passage of the IRCA, the INA
“permitted employers to hire illegal aliens”).
97

98

8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A).

99

Id. § 1324a(a)(1)(B).

100

See Harris, supra note 97, at 900.

See Kati L. Griffith, United States: U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration
Law and Labor and Employment Law, 31 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 125, 141 (2009) (noting the
uncertainty of the interaction of immigration, labor, and employment law following the IRCA’s
passage); infra notes 102–24 and accompanying text.
101

102

846 F.2d 700, 706 (11th Cir. 1988).
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the IRCA, Congress implicitly altered the FLSA’s definition of “employee” by
excluding undocumented workers.103 The court also determined that while the
FLSA and the NLRA are often coextensive, Quality Inn South’s argument that
Sure-Tan’s stance on back pay precluded Patel from remedial relief lacked merit.104
The decisions concerning remedies under the NLRA, the court concluded, had
no bearing on the FLSA’s remedial scheme.105
In Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit considered whether an NLRB order requiring an employer
issue back pay to several undocumented workers violated the IRCA.106 The court
determined the employees were ineligible to receive back pay under Sure-Tan
because they were not lawfully permitted to live and work in the United States.107
The workers were discharged before the IRCA became law, which led the court
to acknowledge its holding only applied to pre-IRCA discharges.108 Despite that
limitation, however, the court then stated that the IRCA “clearly bars” the NLRB
from awarding back pay to undocumented workers.109 In 2002, this issue was
examined by the United States Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB.110

D. The NLRA Still Applies to Undocumented Workers
In 1988, Jose Castro was hired by Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. to
prepare various pharmaceutical products.111 Shortly thereafter, Castro and
several other employees joined a union-organizing campaign.112 In January of
the following year, Hoffman fired Castro and several other employees who also
participated in the unionizing activities.113 Three years later, the NLRB determined
Hoffman terminated Castro and four others in violation of the NLRA.114 During

103
Id. at 704 (finding nothing in the IRCA or its legislative history supporting the notion that
Congress intended to limit the scope of the FLSA).
104

Id. at 705–06.

105

Id. at 706.

106

976 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1992).

107

Id. at 1121–22.

108

Id. at 1122.

Id. In a footnote, the court distinguished Patel v. Quality Inn South because in that case
the workers were seeking payment for work already performed, not for work that would have been
performed. Id. at 1122 n.7. Interestingly, the Patel court used the same logic to distinguish its
holding from Sure-Tan. See Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 705–06 (11th Cir. 1988).
109

110

535 U.S. 137 (2002).

111

Id. at 140.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id. at 140–41.
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a subsequent hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to determine the
amount of back pay Hoffman owed the workers, Castro reported he was neither
born nor legally permitted to enter or work in the United States.115 Castro also
testified that he used fraudulent documents to gain employment with Hoffman.116
Finding a back pay reward in direct conflict with immigration law, the ALJ
refused to order payment to Castro.117 Four years later, the NLRB reversed the
ALJ’s decision, finding that applying the protections and remedies of the NLRA
was “the most effective way to accommodate and further the policies embodied in
[the IRCA].” 118
The United States Supreme Court held the NLRB correctly applied the NLRA
to undocumented workers but erred by granting back pay because immigration
policy limited the NLRB’s remedial power.119 The majority argued immigration
policy demands strict enforcement of laws enacted to curtail employment
of illegal aliens; failing to do so would invite more violations of immigration
law.120 Furthermore, the majority claimed that while immigration policy limited
the remedies available to undocumented workers, Hoffman and other similar
employers would not go unpunished, reciting a list of sanctions available.121
Justice Breyer’s dissent focused on the practical inadequacy of denying
undocumented workers the possibility of back pay because it motivates employers
to seek out undocumented workers.122 The dissent also noted that applying labor
laws equally to undocumented and documented workers would reduce incentive
for workers entering the United States without going through the proper
channels.123 Essentially, the dissent claimed the majority’s attempt to bifurcate
the substantive and remedial rights of undocumented workers undermined both
labor and immigration law.124

E. Status-Based Assignment of Rights
The unstable distinction between the rights afforded to documented
and undocumented workers is not just a problem of legal definition but also

115

Id. at 141.

116

Id.

117

Id.

Id. (quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. and Casimiro Arauz, 326 N.L.R.B. 1060,
1060 (1998)).
118

119

Id. at 144.

120

Id. at 151.

121

Id. at 152.

122

Id. at 155.

123

Id. at 156.

124

Id. at 153.
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of defining membership in a transitional and globalized society.125 In general,
membership is defined—and thus rights are assigned—through either a territorial
or status-based model.126 Territorial models treat physical, geographic presence as
the basis of membership and its associated rights.127 The status-centric approach
assigns rights to persons within a given territory according to their immigration
status.128 Accordingly, in a status-based model, rights are assigned to members of
a society based entirely on governmentally sanctioned and distributed labels.129
The United States and its immigration laws traditionally follow a territorial-based
assignment of rights in which physical presence within the jurisdiction establishes
a minimal set of rights.130
Some areas of the law are moving toward a more nuanced form of territorialbased membership.131 In the context of primary education for undocumented
children, social factors like community involvement and maintaining family
cohesion are usurping immigration status as the determinant factors.132 The

125
See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 52 (1983) (questioning the distinction between
residency and citizenship); Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate,
Unequal, and Without Representation, 9 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 4–8 (2006) (noting the discrepancy
in effective tax rates between undocumented and documented workers based on status “despite their
net positive contribution to public coffers”); Núñez, supra note 14, at 824–28.

See Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality
35–36 (2009) (discussing the manner in which citizenship is the basis for participation in the
governance of a given polity); Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of
Immigrants, 8 Theoretical Inquiries L. 389, 390 (2007) (noting the two primary methods of
assigning rights “derive from either . . . formal status under law or . . . territorial presence”).
126

See Bosniak, supra note 126, at 391 (noting the territorial method’s focus on “the normative
significance of the physical fact of presence in the national space”); Núñez, supra note 14, at 825–26
(distinguishing between territorial and status-based models of membership, noting the former’s use
of “geographic boundaries” in distributing rights); Rick Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration
Regulation, 47 Hous. L. Rev. 367, 391 (2010) (“[B]oundary lines not only determine which public
resources are ours and which are theirs, but help to define who ‘we’ and ‘they’ are.” (quoting Gerald
E. Frug, City Making 15 (1999))).
127

128
See Walzer, supra note 125, at 43 (noting “full membership” in a country often depends
on nationality).

See Bosniak, supra note 126, at 390–91 (discussing the basics of the status-based approach,
in particular the role of “a state’s immigration admissions and citizenship allocation systems” in
creating various sets of rights depending on one’s status); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9,
at 1362 (“[A] person’s basket of rights fills as his immigration status formalizes.”); Núñez, supra
note 14, at 826 (discussing the shortcomings of a status-based approach and its dependence on
governmental categorization).
129

Núñez, supra note 14, at 819; see Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1363 (“Regardless
of status, there is a floor on the level of protections enjoyed by all persons territorially present in the
United States.” (emphasis added)).
130

131

See infra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982) (holding undocumented children have the
right of access to public education because, inter alia, the American education system is instrumental
in civic and community engagement); Jacquelyn Hagan, Brianna Castro & Nestor Rodriguez, The
132
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issuance of driver’s licenses to undocumented workers raises similar issues.133
Labor and employment law, on the other hand, are becoming increasingly statusbased.134 This shift has serious implications for workers—undocumented or
not—as well as employers.135

III. Analysis
This section begins by addressing the problems associated with a shift toward
a status-based assignment of rights.136 It notes the danger of expanding the United
States Supreme Court’s holding in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB and
then discusses the unclear legal realm in which undocumented workers now
reside.137 Further, this section evaluates the parallels between the history of African
Americans and women with the current uncertainty faced by undocumented

Effects of U.S. Deportation Policies on Immigrant Families and Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives,
88 N.C. L. Rev. 1799, 1823 (2010) (noting deportation “undermines the cornerstone of stated
U.S. immigration policy—family reunification”).
See Stephen H. Legomsky & Cristina M. Rodríguez, Immigration and Refugee Law
1225–28 (5th ed. 2009) (noting the debate over whether driver’s licenses are meant
to enforce immigration laws or maintain public safety by ensuring a minimal level of experience);
Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future of Civil Rights Law?,
5 Nev. L.J. 213, 218–20 (2004) (discussing the legal and societal implications of undocumented
immigrants receiving driver’s licenses).
133

and Policy

Núñez, supra note 14, at 848; see Ellen Dannin, Hoffman Plastics as Labor Law—Equality
At Last for Immigrant Workers?, 44 U.S.F. L. Rev. 393, 412–13 (2009) (discussing the Hoffman
Court’s focus on immigration status as the determining factor as to the availability of remedies and
arguing such a focus was irrelevant to the NLRA); Brackman, supra note 32, at 725 (noting that
protections under the NLRA vary depending on one’s immigration status).
134

Núñez, supra note 14, at 863; see Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1363–64
(noting that since Hoffman, employers have attempted to expand the Court’s holding to further
limit the remedies available to undocumented workers); Griffith, supra note 101, at 160 (discussing
how excluding undocumented workers from union-related activities hurts their legally employed
counterparts by diminishing the collective bargaining power of the group).
135

136
See Núñez, supra note 14, at 863 (discussing how the encroachment of the status-based
approach garners inconsistent and unpredictable legal outcomes and creates a reality in which
immigration policy is undermined); Pham, supra note 14, at 1119–20, 1153–54 (noting the
creation of “a new paradigm, where immigration borders are moving and multiple, affecting all
residents, both in the interior and at the boundaries of the United States” and how these borders are
detrimental to the rights of undocumented workers); infra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
137
See infra notes 145–55 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of Hoffman);
infra notes 156–60 and accompanying text (addressing the tenuous nature of life as an undocu
mented worker); see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Tales of Hoffman, 92-DEC A.B.A. J. 12, 12, 14
(2006) (noting the concern that courts have misinterpreted Hoffman and expanded its holding too
far); Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 Ga. L. Rev.
65, 157 (2009) (discussing how “undocumented immigrants are perpetually at risk of apprehension,
arrest, detention, and deportation”).
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workers.138 This section concludes with a consideration of potential solutions to
the problems created by Hoffman.139
By failing to provide undocumented workers who are victims of illegal
employer actions with any substantial remedy, the Hoffman decision embodies
a logical disconnect between law and remedy and removes much of the punitive
bite Congress delegated to administrative agencies in the NLRA and similar
statutes.140 In doing so, the United States Supreme Court implicitly relegated
the undocumented worker to a sub-class of societal membership, which is
simultaneously protected by and excluded from the laws of the United States.141
Undocumented workers are protected by the NLRA, but Hoffman limits their
recourse.142 Under the current legal regime, immigration status, more than any
other categorization or trait, determines the rights of the undocumented worker.
Hoffman and its progeny indicate a shift toward the status-centric approach,
which limits the rights of workers based on their immigration status.143 Limiting
the rights of undocumented workers based on their status tolerates exploitation by
unscrupulous employers, allows discrimination based on perceived immigration
status, and negatively affects the entire workforce.144 Further, the shift toward a
status-centric approach creates confusion and inconsistencies in other areas of law.

138

See infra notes 161–73 and accompanying text.

139

See infra notes 179–85 and accompanying text.

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 156–57 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that withholding remedies from undocumented workers “leave[s] helpless the
very persons who most need protection from exploitative employer practices”); see Walsh, supra note
8, at 333–39 (explaining the Hoffman Court’s error in ignoring the congressional intent behind the
IRCA and how that error negatively affects the NLRB’s discretionary powers).
140

141
See, e.g., Núñez, supra note 14, at 853–54 (discussing the manner in which Hoffman
leaves undocumented workers in a “no-man’s-land” by deeming them protected by the NLRA,
yet precluding the availability of a remedy); Walsh, supra note 8, at 339 (noting a loss of labor law
protections affects “an entire class of people”).
142

Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148–49.

143

See Núñez, supra note 14, at 849–50; infra note 152 and accompanying text.

See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893 (1984) (“Application of the NLRA helps to
assure that the wages and employment conditions of lawful residents are not adversely affected by the
competition of illegal alien employees who are not subject to the standard terms of employment.”
(emphasis added)); Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the
Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 737, 739 (2003)
(discussing how withholding remedies from undocumented workers “dichotomize[s] two bodies
of law, ultimately trouncing worker protections in the name of immigration control”); Griffith,
supra note 101, at 160; Lewinter, supra note 51, at 537; Núñez, supra note 14, at 863 (noting how
maintaining separate standards for documented and undocumented workers “erode[s] workplace
standards for all employees”); Walsh, supra note 8, at 339–40.
144
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Undocumented workers live a precarious life in the United States.145 The
promise of better jobs with higher wages attracts workers from all parts of the
world.146 Many of these workers are unable to obtain proper documentation, yet
enter the United States nonetheless.147 Their method of entry is certainly illegal,
yet many consider their very existence—not just their physical presence in the
United States—illicit148 and contend that undocumented workers steal jobs from
the legal American workforce.149 Yet these very same workers often fill valuable
and needed roles in American society.150 If the trend toward a strictly status-based

145
See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1362 (discussing the conditions that attract
undocumented workers to the United States as well as the growing hostility toward their presence);
Lewinter, supra note 51, at 509 (noting while many undocumented workers receive low wages and
suffer poor working conditions, they are often afraid to report such abuses for fear of retaliation
or deportation).
146
Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the “attractive force of
employment, which like a ‘magnet’ pulls illegal immigrants toward the United States”); see Phi Mai
Nguyen, Comment, Closing the Back Door on Illegal Immigration: Over Two Decades of Ineffective
Provisions While Solutions Are Just a Few Words Away, 13 Chap. L. Rev. 615, 623–24 (2010) (noting
the most influential factor in undocumented immigration is lucrative job opportunities); see also
Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United
States 21 (2009) (finding that while the majority of undocumented immigrants come from Mexico
and other Latin American countries (81%), significant portions of the undocumented population
come from Asia (11%), the Middle East (under 2%), and Europe (over 4%)).
147
See Lipman, supra note 125, at 11–13 (discussing how the demand for immigrant workers
exceeds the availability of green cards or other forms of obtaining legal immigration status, thereby
resulting in large numbers of undocumented workers); Nguyen, supra note 146, at 623–24 (noting
the economic incentives for entering the United States illegally often outweigh the risks of life as an
undocumented worker in the minds of potential immigrants).

See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006) (subjecting an alien that “enters or attempts to enter” the
United States illegally to a fine, imprisonment, or both); Legomsky, supra note 137, at 144–45
(discussing the ways in which immigration violations are viewed differently from other violations of
law). Despite illegal entry being a misdemeanor under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), undocumented workers
are often considered egregious lawbreakers, and by extension their presence is deemed illegal.
Legomsky, supra note 137, at 144–45; see also Edmund Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, in
Confronting Injustice: The Edmond Cahn Reader 15, 26 (Lenore L. Cahn ed., 1966) (noting
the manner in which the law reduces complex matters to overly simplistic truths using the example
of how a juvenile delinquent is labeled a lawbreaker, ignoring “what else he may be”); CunninghamParmeter, supra note 9, at 1401 (noting how undocumented workers are viewed as violators that
threaten “democracy and membership for those lawfully present”).
148

149
See Paul Weiler, Enhancing Worker Lives Through Fairer Labor and Worklife Law in
Comparative Perspective, 25 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 143, 147–48 (2003) (claiming illegal
immigrants cause a “major competitive problem” for the legal workforce); Brackman, supra note 32,
at 717 (noting that undocumented workers “flood” job markets, leaving fewer and fewer jobs for
legal residents); Nguyen, supra note 146, at 619 (observing that many in the United States consider
undocumented immigrants a threat to legal job-seekers and a burden on the system).
150
Passel & Cohn, supra note 146, at iv. Undocumented workers comprise substantial portions
of the farming, construction, and food service industries. Id.; see also Orrin Baird, Undocumented
Workers and the NLRA: Hoffman Plastic Compounds and Beyond, 19 Lab. Law. 153, 160 (noting
that forty-eight percent of agricultural workers are undocumented); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra
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conception of membership continues, undocumented workers will find themselves
even further removed from the protections of the laws of the United States.151
Subsequent cases have attempted to extend the Hoffman majority’s reasoning
to broader issues such as the issuance of driver’s licenses to undocumented
immigrants, inquiries into immigration status during discovery in discrimination
suits, workers’ compensation, and changing definitions of “employee.” 152
This trend further destabilizes the rights of undocumented workers through a
presumption that their physical presence in the United States challenges notions
of membership.153 They are physically present, yet legally invisible; they have

note 9, at 1362 (explaining how undocumented workers are “wanted yet disdained, needed yet
derided”); Nguyen, supra note 146, at 615 (arguing the historical disdain for immigrants in the
United States has been translated into policies focused on stifling illegal immigration).
151
Lenni Benson, The Invisible Worker, 27 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 483, 484 (2001).
Benson, while discussing the potential pitfalls of focusing entirely on the undocumented worker’s
immigration status, notes:

Legal definitions not only define who is a legal immigrant but also, by necessity, create
the converse—the “illegal” or undocumented workers . . . . [They] go far beyond being
mere labels, and instead become the building blocks of legal status, creating intentional
and unintentional interactions with other laws such as criminal law, family law, tax
law, and labor and employment law. These labels . . . give rise to a class of invisible
people: People who do not fit within the legal system . . . existing in an underground
world—a world of invisible workers.
Id. (emphasis added); see Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1414 (noting the Supreme Court’s
portrayal of remedial relief for undocumented workers as the rewarding of illegal behavior threatens
to further the decline in undocumented workers’ rights); Pham, supra note 14, at 1121 (arguing
that by requiring proof of immigration status at various junctures within the United States’ borders,
the trend toward status-based membership threatens to banish undocumented workers from the
periphery of society to the exterior).
Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 2004) (Bea, J., dissenting) (arguing
that allowing the plaintiff to bar inquiries into her immigration status during pretrial discovery
was contrary to federal immigration law); Sanchez v. Iowa, 692 N.W.2d 812, 821 (Iowa 2005)
(confirming the legality of Iowa’s “practice of denying driver’s licenses to illegal aliens”); Correa v.
Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324, 331–32 (Minn. 2003) (Gilbert, J., dissenting) (arguing
that providing disability benefits to an injured undocumented worker would “reward him for staying
in the United States illegally and encourage him to violate IRCA by finding further employment”);
Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 476–77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding a claim
for discriminatory termination brought by an undocumented worker could not survive because
her immigration status served as a statutory bar to employment, which precluded any damages
pursuant to her termination); see Hudson, supra note 137, at 12, 14; Johnson, supra note 133, at
219–20 (noting that courts are hesitant to invalidate laws precluding undocumented immigrants
from obtaining driver’s licenses).
152

See Núñez, supra note 14, at 817; Pham, supra note 14, at 1152 (noting immigration status
now forms the primary division between the people that “belong in our national community” and
those that should remain outside because they have not been granted the community’s permission to
stay); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 Colum. J. Transnat’l
L. 319, 335 (discussing the ways in which immigration issues challenge notions of community and
communal values).
153
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some minimal rights, but no means of enforcing those rights.154 Because a statusbased approach creates a class of undocumented workers simultaneously included
in American society but excluded from its legal system, Hoffman and its progeny
threaten to push those workers further into the shadows.155
This dualistic existence leaves undocumented workers in an undefined
realm.156 They have some rights, but not others; the law is unclear.157 This is known
as partial inclusion.158 An undocumented worker enjoys some basic rights without
obtaining any level of official immigration status.159 Yet this lack of immigration
status prevents workers from obtaining and exercising other rights.160
The partial inclusion of African Americans and women in the United
States legal system—often seen as proof that the system merely serves to
maintain the status quo of political power—demonstrates the inverse of the
undocumented worker’s predicament.161 These groups, unlike undocumented
workers, were protected by the immigration regime because they were citizens
but were nonetheless denied certain civil rights.162 Given their status as citizens,
however, the progress of women and African Americans had a legal foundation
for advancing change unavailable to undocumented workers. In particular, the
civil rights movement illuminates the manner in which the legal system addresses
groups claiming some form of discrimination.163 Generally, such issues are viewed
in one of two ways: from the perpetrator perspective or the victim perspective.164
154
See Benson, supra note 151, at 484; Pham supra note 14, at 1163 (discussing how using
immigration status as a key to defining membership affects both documented and undocumented
workers alike).

See Hudson, supra note 137, at 12, 14; Lipman, supra note 125, at 1–7 (noting that
undocumented immigrants are required to pay taxes yet are barred from government benefits).
155

156

See Núñez, supra note 14, at 853.

See Nhan T. Vu & Jeff Schwartz, Workplace Rights and Illegal Immigration: How Implied
Repeal Analysis Cuts Through the Haze of Hoffman Plastic, its Predecessors and its Progeny, 29
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 40 (2008).
157

158

Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1403.

159

See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1363; Núñez, supra note 14, at 819.

160

See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).

See Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv.
C.R.C.L. Rev. 323, 327–28 (1987) (“[L]egal ideals are manipulable and [the] law serves to
legitimate existing maldistributions of wealth and power . . . [which] rings true for anyone who has
experienced life in non-white America.”).
161

162

Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1402–03.

See Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the
Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 525, 525–26 (2000)
(noting the traces of racial discrimination present in immigration law and policy); Karla Mari
McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 Harv. J. Racial
& Ethnic Just. 163 passim (2010) (analogizing the discriminatory effects Jim Crow laws had on
African-Americans to contemporary anti-immigration laws’ effects on Latinos).
163

See generally Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in The Politics of
Law 121 (David Kairys ed., 1990) [hereinafter Freeman I] (using the victim/perpetrator framework
164
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The perpetrator perspective, a dominant force in American jurisprudence, is
employed when laws are crafted to detect and punish individual violators.165 The
perpetrator perspective assumes that society as a whole is functioning properly
and that “all we need do is identify and catch villains.”166 In the context of civil
rights this meant that by passing legislation, which focused on racist violators
of civil rights laws, the rest of society no longer bore any responsibility for the
deeply ingrained and residual problems of racism.167 Yet a legal regime focused
solely on apprehending and punishing a particular perpetrator often overlooks the
actual problem.168

to analyze Supreme Court antidiscrimination doctrine from the 1950s through the 1980s); Alan
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review
of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1977) [hereinafter Freeman II]. Edmund
Cahn discusses an analogous dichotomy. See Cahn, supra note 148, at 15–31 (explaining the
“imperialist” and “consumer” perspectives). Cahn’s “imperialist” perspective assumes the point of
view of government officials and seeks to instill efficiency and order. Id. at 17, 24. The “consumer”
perspective, on the other hand, analyzes a law or principle according to the perspective of its targeted
audience and how it affects the community. Id. at 25.
165
See Gabriel Arkles, Pooja Gehi & Elana Redfield, The Role of Lawyers in Trans Liberation:
Building a Transformative Movement for Social Change, 8 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 579, 597 (2010)
(acknowledging the law’s “deep investment” in the perpetrator perspective and how it weakens
the law’s ability to effectively address discrimination); Freeman I, supra note 164, at 125 (noting
the dominant role of the perpetrator perspective); Namoi Murkakawa & Katherine Beckett, The
Penology of Racial Innocence: The Erasure of Racism in the Study and Practice of Punishment, 44 Law
& Soc’y Rev. 695, 700–01 (2010) (describing the perpetrator perspective); Laura Beth Nielsen &
Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as
a Claiming System, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 663, 676 (2005) (noting the manner in which employment
discrimination law is characterized by the perpetrator perspective).

Freeman I, supra note 164, at 125; see Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback from the
Left, 54 St. Louis U. L.J. 1139, 1146–47 (2010) (noting the perpetrator perspective’s erroneous
focus on “the misfiring neurons in a few pathological individuals”); Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial
Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1023,
1069 (2010) (noting “when conceptualized as bad acts by bad persons,” conceptions of racism
and discrimination overlook “disparate social outcomes”); Nielson & Nelson, supra note 165, at
676 (“[L]aw has the more limited purpose of remedying specific intentional wrongs, rather than
redressing systemic aspects of discrimination and inequality . . . .”).
166

167
See Freeman II, supra note 164, at 1073–74 (discussing the assumption that outlawing a
practice indicates that practice was a deviation from the norm, which in turn implies the status quo
precludes the practice). Accordingly, by simply passing anti-discrimination laws, society believes it
is reinforcing an already existing norm. See id.; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 325 (1987) (describing
the perpetrator perspective mindset that if the law no longer discriminates, society is not responsible
for a group’s “subordinate position”); Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 Vand. L.
Rev. 297, 311–12 (1990) (“[We] can claim the mantle of innocence only by denying the charge of
racism. We as white persons and nonracists are innocent; we have done no harm to those people
and do not deserve to suffer for the sins of the other, not innocent white people who were racists.”
(emphasis added)).

See Cahn, supra note 148, at 26 (noting how the law would benefit greatly from a
“sensibility to human impacts”); Kang, supra note 166, at 1147 (arguing the perpetrator perspective
is overly narrow and that society should look beyond “individual pathologies”); López, supra note
168
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The victim perspective is concerned with the social conditions associated
with a problem instead of the individual violators of a particular law.169 When
social conditions plaguing an adversely affected group of people persist despite
passage of a new law designed to prevent such conditions, that law is deemed
ineffective.170 Instead of focusing on violations, the victim perspective proposes
adopting laws and policies that effectuate change in social conditions.171 Thus, the
victim perspective looks to actual results in the day-to-day lives of an adversely
affected group, while the perpetrator perspective presupposes that the work has
been done: as soon as the legislation was signed into law, society changed.172
The Hoffman decision reinforces the perpetrator perspective. Under
Hoffman, the undocumented worker’s entry and presence renders him the original
perpetrator.173 As such, the illegal immigrant, having never attained legal status,
is always and already violating the rule of law. This reductive approach portrays
an overly narrow-sighted depiction of the undocumented worker by fixing his
identity to an illegal presence, by making him a perpetual perpetrator.

166, at 1069 (noting the perpetrator perspective “is neither natural nor obvious . . . [and] ultimately
supplanted a developing structural conception of racial hierarchy”); Rebecca Davis, Comment,
Opportunistic Hate Crimes Targeting Symbolic Property: When Free Speech Is Not Free, 10 J. Gender
Race & Just. 93, 104 (2006) (“When society views the hate act as ‘rational’ or as a ‘logical’ extension
of a crime in process, rather than extreme or deviant, society itself ‘contributes to and reinforces
the social environment that makes the practices seem useful or sensible to perpetrators.’” (quoting
Lu-in Wang, “Suitable Targets”? Parallels and Connections Between “Hate” Crimes and “Driving While
Black”, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 209, 235 (2001))).
169
See Arkles et al., supra note 165, at 597 (describing how the victim perspective views the
problem as “those conditions of actual social existence as a member of an underclass”); Devon W.
Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 946, 970 (2002) (noting, in the
context of racial discrimination in police searches, that the victim perspective is not concerned with
individual “bad cop[s],” but rather with how race shapes the societal interactions between “police
officers and nonwhite persons”); Freeman II, supra note 164, at 1053 (“[T]he problem will not be
solved until the conditions associated with it have been eliminated.”).
170
See Freeman I, supra note 164, at 125; Lawrence, supra note 167, at 324 (arguing that
anti-discrimination laws focused solely on culpably racist individuals lead “us to think about racism
in a way that advances the disease rather than combating it”).

See Freeman II, supra note 164, at 1053 (noting actions to remedy racial discrimination
should be centered around “affirmative efforts to change the condition”). Similarly, Cahn’s
“consumer perspective” requires a consideration of the needs of those affected by the law. See Cahn,
supra note 148, at 27.
171

172
See Freeman I, supra note 164, at 1053 n.16 (discussing the differences between the two
perspectives); Cecil J. Hunt, II, Color of Perspective: Affirmative Action and the Constitutional Rhetoric
of White Innocence, 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 477, 509–10 (2006) (noting the victim perspective
“focuses on the injury or loss suffered by the victims,” while the perpetrator perspective “reinforces
the notion that racism is primarily a function of individual actors”).

See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 150–51 (2002) (noting the
plaintiff ’s presence was in itself a violation of the law); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 9, at 1414
(discussing how focusing on immigration status at the expense of other statuses is harmful).
173
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If the undocumented worker is depicted as the perpetrator—if by his mere
presence he is the signifier of problems resulting from illegal immigration and
deemed to be illegal—then society no longer bears the responsibility of addressing
the problems underlying illegal immigration.174 If membership derives solely
from one’s immigration status, then the problems of illegal immigration will
not simply remain unfixed; they will become exacerbated.175 The status-centric
approach frames the issue of the undocumented worker’s rights in such a way
that punishing and excluding those undocumented workers would solve the
much larger problems of illegal immigration.176 Yet by dissuading workers from
demanding (or at least denying their ability to exercise) employment rights, this
approach encourages employers to continue hiring undocumented workers.177 If
an employer can violate labor and employment laws knowing an undocumented
worker has fewer means of legal retribution, she would be more likely to hire
an illegal worker than his legal counterpart.178 In this way, the entire workforce
is affected.
To address the problem at its root, energy must first be devoted to stabilizing
the current system. Given the uncertainty of a status-centric approach to assigning
rights to undocumented workers, bestowing the rights afforded to all documented
workers on those without proper documentation would strengthen the system.179
174
See Dannin, supra note 134, at 400–03 (noting that in Hoffman, the United States Supreme
Court shifted blame from the NLRA-violating company to the undocumented worker victim);
Freeman I, supra note 164, at 1055 (discussing how the perpetrator perspective allows others in
society to “not feel any personal responsibility for the conditions associated with discrimination”).

See Freeman I, supra note 164, at 1055 (noting that society feels a strong resentment
for bearing the costs of eradicating discriminatory conditions, particularly when those costs are
traditionally imposed on guilty parties); Hagan et al., supra note 132, at 1822–23 (noting stricter
immigration enforcement adversely affects business, families, and communities).
175

176
Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150 (“Indeed, awarding backpay in a case like this not only trivializes
immigration laws, it also condones and encourages future violations.”).

See Griffith, supra note 101, at 140–41 (noting the negative effects of the current immigration
scheme as being “catastrophic for the labor rights of immigrant and  U.S. workers” (emphasis added)
(quoting Rebecca Smith & Catherince Ruckelhaus, Solutions, Not Scapegoats: Abating Sweatshop
Conditions for All Low-Wage Workers as a Centerpiece of Immigration Reform, 10 N.Y.U. J. Leg. & Pub.
Pol’y 555, 557 (2007))); Lewinter, supra note 51, at 537 (arguing that Hoffman allows employers to
violate labor laws and encourages exploitation of undocumented workers).
177

178
See Lewinter, supra note 51, at 537; Rachel Bloomekatz, Comment, Rethinking Immigration
Status Discrimination and Exploitation in the Low-Wage Workplace, 54 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1963, 1964
(2007) (“[M]any employers actually prefer to hire immigrants rather than U.S. workers, believing
that the former are more easily exploitable.”). Employer preference for undocumented workers
has given rise to a new breed of discrimination claims brought by U.S. workers against employers
thought to hire according to immigration status. See Bloomekatz, supra, at 1985.
179
See Núñez, supra note 14, at 853–54 (discussing how immigration status has “seeped”
into many areas of the law, creating complex “new dimension[s]” of litigation); Walsh, supra note
8, at 339 (discussing how workers have historically depended on the labor and employment laws
to maintain consistent working conditions); Brackman, supra note 32, at 728 (noting that all
employees are affected when an alien is prohibited from exerting certain rights).
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Giving undocumented workers equal rights in the employment sector would
deter discriminatory labor practices and improve conditions for all workers by
removing incentives for employers to hire undocumented workers or utilize illegal
practices.180 With that in mind, it may also discourage those considering illegal
entry from doing so.181
Solutions to problems created by and related to withholding remedial rights
from undocumented workers may come in several forms. Courts could limit the
holding of Hoffman to a very narrow set of factual circumstances. This approach,
however, would nonetheless allow employers to hire and discriminate against
undocumented workers.182 Given the statutory origins of the problem, a legislative
solution would provide a more thorough treatment.
The legislature should amend IRCA to include language expressly preventing
immigration status from trumping rights otherwise afforded under labor and
employment statutes. The legislative history behind IRCA supports such a
clarification of the statute’s scope and limitations.183 In doing so, Congress could
dispel the ubiquitous confusion regarding the interaction between the IRCA and
the NLRA, FLSA, and other statutes.184 Further, express language will bolster the
policies supporting the various statutes by simultaneously discouraging behavior
those statutes aim to curb.185

180
See Walsh, supra note 8, at 338–39 (asserting that excluding undocumented workers from
the protections of labor and employment laws would “open the floodgate for serious abuses by
employers along with a depression of wages”); Brackman, supra note 32, at 729–30 (discussing
the problems associated with denying undocumented workers remedies under the NLRA); Irene
Zopoth Hudson & Susan Schenck, Note, America: Land of Opportunity or Exploitation, 19 Hofstra
Lab. & Emp. L.J. 351, 376 (noting labor and employment law’s dual goals of deterring violations
and compensating victims).

See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that withholding back pay
“could not significantly increase the strength of [the] magnetic force” that attracts undocumented
workers to the United States); Harris, supra note 97, at 928–29 (noting that enforcing both
immigration and labor laws will weaken employer incentives to hire undocumented workers).
181

182
See Lewinter, supra note 51, at 537 (noting the Hoffman decision “rewards employers who
hire workers that they suspect have falsified documents by allowing these employers to flout NLRA
protections without sanction”).
183
H.R. Rep. No. 99-682 (II), at 5758 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5758
(“[T]he committee does not intend that any provision of this Act would limit the powers . . . to
remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented employees . . . .” (emphasis added)); see
Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting that in section 111(d) of the
IRCA, “Congress specifically authorized the appropriation of additional funds for increased FLSA
enforcement on behalf of undocumented workers”).
184
See Nguyen, supra note 146, at 639 (noting the confusion in lower courts since the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman).
185
See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]t reasonably helps to deter
unlawful activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent.”).
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IV. Conclusion
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, the United States Supreme
Court could have clarified an extremely confused area of the law. Instead, it
blurred the relationship between immigration, labor, and employment law even
further.186 The NLRA and other statutes have specific definitions of “employee,”
all of which are extremely broad.187 Immigration law remained silent on the issue
of undocumented workers until Congress passed the IRCA.188 In Hoffman, the
Court focused on the illegal presence, employment, and continued stay of an
undocumented worker, citing national immigration policy as the impetus for
this focus.189 The Court’s decision pushed undocumented workers further into
the netherworld of illegal immigration by depriving them of legally prescribed
remedies.190 In reality—and contrary to the majority’s contention—the holding
in Hoffman did not bolster workers’ rights and immigration policy; it undermined
them by focusing solely on immigration status.191
Concern over the effects of illegal immigration on American job markets
remains a hot-button political issue as well as a source of much legal contention.192
As efforts to combat a perceived torrent of illegal immigrants are taken up by the
states,193 the federal government remains undecided on how to proceed. Unless
corrected, the disconnect between labor, employment, and immigration law will
only lead to greater uncertainty. Issues ranging from employment verification
systems and collective bargaining to driver’s licenses and the right to education
will remain unsettled. In order to harmonize these statutory frameworks, Congress
should act to provide undocumented workers with the full protections of labor
and employment laws and expressly forbid the IRCA from allowing immigration
status to preclude the remedies Congress sought to provide.194
See Garcia, supra note 144, at 744 (noting the Hoffman Court “highlighted the
ineffectiveness of immigration law, and labor law’s inability to protect all workers”); supra notes
140–60 and accompanying text.
186

187

See supra notes 29–95 and accompanying text (discussing these statutory frameworks).

See supra notes 102–10 and accompanying text (discussing relevant immigration statutes
and case law).
188

189

See supra notes 111–24 and accompanying text (discussing Hoffman).

190

See supra notes 145–51 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 143–85 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers posed by Hoffman
to immigration, employment, and labor laws).
191

192
See, e.g., Tamar Jacoby, Editorial, Immigration Reform: A State-by-State Approach Might
Break the D.C. Logjam, LATimes.com (Mar. 25, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/25/
opinion/la-oe-jacoby-utah-20110325; Your World with Neil Cavuto: Interview with Wyoming Senator
John Barrasso (Fox News Network television broadcast Aug. 2, 2010), available at http://www.
youtube.com/v/RO5OdtgROiA?f=videos&app=youtube_gdata (discussing illegal immigration,
Senator Barrasso stated, “The American people don’t want these folks, who are criminals, who have
come to this country illegally . . . .”).
193

See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.

194

See supra notes 179–85 and accompanying text.
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